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Abstract 
 
For some time, practitioners and academics have been trying to determine whether it is better for 
a company's shareholders to allow the CEO of the company to also be Chairman of the Board (a 
unitary leadership structure) or whether another person (an independent director) should hold the 
board Chair position (a dual leadership structure)   Not surprisingly, most executives believe one 
person should hold both positions while academics hold mixed views on the subject.  The 
empirical results presented in this study suggest that a dual leadership structure is superior for 
most firms because it allows the board to better control the opportunistic behavior of the firm's 
managers.  Specifically, as agency theory predicts, dual leadership firms pay lower compensation 
to their CEOs, have lower selling, general, and administrative expenses, use more debt in their 
capital structures, pay out more of their free cash flows to investors, and are more profitable than 
unitary leadership firms.  Each of these results indicates less opportunistic behavior by the 
managers of dual leadership firms. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
ver the last 20 years or so finance, accounting, and management practitioners and academics have been 
trying to determine if it is better for a firm to have different people holding the Chairman of the Board 
and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) positions (a dual leadership structure) or whether one person should 
hold both positions (a unitary leadership structure).  Agency theorists argue that a dual leadership structure is 
preferable because a Chair/CEO may keep the board from performing one of its most important functions, 
monitoring the senior managers of the firm.  A unitary leadership structure could allow the Chair/CEO and other 
senior managers to engage in behavior that was detrimental to the interests of the firm’s shareholders.  Others have 
argued that having a unitary leadership structure is preferable because it actually contributes to the effective 
functioning of the board.  They believe that making the CEO the Chairman of the Board promotes better 
communication and information flow between management and the board and results in better decision making by 
the board.  In this paper, I will discuss the relevant leadership structure theories and review some empirical tests 
performed by myself (Fosberg (1999, 2003), Fosberg and Mulnix (2001) and Fosberg and Rosenberg (2003)) and 
other authors that seek to determine which leadership structure is superior. 
  
Leadership Structure Theories  
 
 The theory that a dual leadership structure is superior was first put forth by Fama and Jensen (1983).  Fama 
and Jensen note that one of the most important functions of a board of directors is to monitor the senior management 
of the firm to make certain they are acting in ways that are consistent with the interests of the owners of the firm 
(shareholders).  However, because of the authority they possess, senior managers are in a position to use the assets of 
the firm to pursue their own interests even though those actions harm the interests of the firm's shareholders (lower 
shareholder wealth).  This type of activity by managers is called opportunistic behavior.  Examples of opportunistic 
behavior by managers include drawing excessive compensation, consuming an excessive amount of perks, shirking 
their responsibilities, etc.  It is the responsibility of the board of directors to make certain that managers do not 
engage in any type of opportunistic behavior.  To be effective in this pursuit, the board must not be under the control 
of the CEO (or other managers of the firm).  Making the CEO the board Chair puts the CEO in a position to gain 
O 
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effective control of the board and subvert the monitoring functioning of the board.  This is likely to occur because 
the Chair controls or heavily influences the nomination of people to fill board vacancies and the appointment of 
directors to board committees, sets board meeting agendas, and controls the flow of information to board members.  
If the CEO/Chair uses this power to pack the board with people who will not effectively monitor the firm's managers 
or limits the flow of information to the board, managers will be free to engage in a wide range of opportunistic 
behavior.  As a consequence, shareholder wealth (the value of the firm's common stock) will decline.  To prevent this 
from occurring, the Chair must an independent director.  An independent director is someone who is not a current or 
former manager of the company and has no business relationships with the firm.  I will call this the agency problem 
theory of leadership structure. 
 
Those holding the contrary opinion, including Anderson and Anthony (1986) and Vancil (1987), believe 
that a unitary leadership structure is superior because it provides for a better flow of information to the board of 
directors.  Proponents of this theory argue that for the board to function properly it is vital that the board be supplied 
with timely and accurate information about the operations of the firm.  They argue that the requisite information flow 
to the board can be most effectively accomplished when the CEO is also the Chairman of the Board because the 
CEO has the most detailed knowledge about the operations of the firm.  The CEO/Chair can then bring to the board's 
attention the issues and information that directors need to consider.  Thus, allowing the CEO to also be the Chair will 
put in charge of the board the person best able to supply the board with the timely and accurate information the board 
needs to perform effectively.  Having someone else serve as Chair would result in a reduced flow of information to 
the board and compromise board decision making.  This theory implies that the monitoring problems created by 
allowing one person to be both Chair and CEO are relatively small in comparison to the benefits of enhanced 
information flow to the board.  I will call this the information flow theory.  In the following sections, I summarize the 
results of a number of studies, conducted by myself and several coauthors and reported in other papers, that 
empirically test the above theories. 
 
Sample Selection 
 
 The sample of firms used in these studies was taken from the Business Week executive compensation 
studies.  Each year Business Week reports the annual compensation and the titles held by the two highest paid 
executives of approximately 350 of the largest U.S. corporations.  For each year from 1990 through 1996, I 
constructed a sample of firms matched by leadership structure and firm size.  To be included in the sample for a 
given year a matched pair of firms had to be found which met the following criteria:
1
  1) a firm with a dual leadership 
structure and a similar firm with a unitary leadership structure had to be found.  A unitary leadership firm was 
considered similar if it was in the same Business Week industry grouping and of approximately the same size 
(measured by sales) as the dual leadership firm and 2) each firm must have the same leadership structure and the 
same CEO for the sample year and the previous year.  This procedure yielded a sample of 178 firms, half with a dual 
leadership structure and half with a unitary leadership structure.
2
   Summary statistics for selected variables from the 
sample firms are presented in Table 1.  As expected, the sample firms are quite large, with mean annual sales of 
$4.612 billion.  On average, the sample firms are also profitable, with mean a ROE (return on equity) of 17.3%.  The 
CEOs of the sample firms received average total compensation of $2.603 million in the sample year. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
 
 In the empirical analysis, I test to see if there is any evidence that managers of unitary leadership firms 
engage in more opportunistic behavior than managers of dual leadership firms, as predicted by the agency problem 
theory.  To test this involves trying to measure the costs associated with the opportunistic behavior of managers 
(agency costs).  In that regard, I looked first at CEO compensation.  One of the ways that a CEO can benefit 
themselves at the expense of the firm's shareholders is to draw excessive compensation.  Generally, a CEO should 
receive compensation approximately equal to that being paid to CEOs of comparable firms.  If a CEO/Chair is able 
to control the board, he can request and is likely to receive, more than the going rate of compensation for his 
services.  Consequently, if the agency problem theory is correct, CEOs of unitary leadership firms should receive 
more compensation than CEOs of comparable dual leadership firms.  Compensation paid to the CEOs of unitary and 
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dual leadership firms and the results of all other empirical tests are contained in Table 2.  Looking first at Salary + 
Bonus, unitary leadership CEOs received, on average, $1.405 million in salary and bonus as compared to $1.163 
million for dual leadership CEOs.  Unitary leadership CEOs also receive, on average, $828,000 more in Long-term 
Compensation than dual leadership CEOs.  Long-term Compensation is the sum of retirement benefits, incentive plan 
compensation, and gains from the exercise of stock options.  In total, unitary leadership CEOs received, on average, 
$1.070 million (51.7%) per year more in compensation than dual leadership CEOs.  This compensation difference 
could be justified if the CEO/Chair's activities as board Chair merited that much additional compensation.  However, 
receiving an extra $1 million in compensation for serving as Board Chair seems excessive. 
 
 
 Next, a broader measure of agency costs, a 
firm's selling, general, and administrative expense to 
sales ratio (SGA/Sales), is used to test for 
opportunistic behavior.  Besides drawing excessive 
compensation, opportunistic behavior can take a 
number of other forms including excessive perk 
consumption, shirking of responsibilities, packing the 
company payroll with friends and relatives, etc.  
Examples of excessive perk consumption include 
having multiple country club memberships when one would suffice, using corporate planes for travel when 
commercial airlines could be used more cheaply, having a more expensive than necessary company car, and billing 
the company for personal expenses unrelated to their professional duties.  An example of shirking would be failing to 
exert the effort necessary to keep company expenses under control.  The costs associated with these types of 
activities are likely to show up in the firm's selling, general, and administrative expense (SGA) account.  To further 
control for size differences among the sample firms, SGA expense is divided by each company's sales.  Unitary 
leadership firms have a mean SGA/Sales ratio of .236 versus .202 for dual leadership firms.  The higher SGA/Sales 
ratio for unitary leadership firms means that, on average, unitary leadership firms incur approximately $157 million 
more per year in SGA expense than similar dual leadership firms.  This was calculated by multiplying average sales 
of the sample firms ($4.612 billion) by the difference in mean SGA/Sales ratios (.034). 
 
 Several authors have noted that managers have large proportions of their personal wealth invested in their 
firm's common stock and in firm-specific human capital.  Because their personal wealth is so heavily invested in their 
employers, these managers will lose a large part of their personal wealth if their employer goes bankrupt.  Risk-
averse managers may seek to mitigate this bankruptcy risk by using less than the optimal amount of debt in their 
firm's capital structure.  The agency problem theory predicts that firms with a unitary leadership structure should 
engage in more of this type of opportunistic behavior.  To test this theory, the debt to equity ratio (Debt/Equity) was 
calculated for each of the sample firms.  Consistent with agency theory predictions, unitary leadership firms have a 
lower debt to equity ratio (.438) than dual leadership firms (.551). 
 
 Another agency problem that a dual leadership structure might help in solving is the free cash flow problem 
described by Jensen (1986).  Free cash flow is money left over after all the firm’s positive NPV (net present value) 
projects have been financed.  Jensen argues that this free cash flow should be paid out to the firm’s security holders.  
This could be accomplished by either disbursing the free cash flow as dividends to preferred and common 
stockholders and/or increasing the amount of debt in the firm’s capital structure and paying the free cash flow out as 
interest on that debt.  Although it is clearly not in the interest of the firm’s shareholders, managers may invest some 
of the firm's free cash flow in negative NPV projects that increase firm size in order to obtain the personal benefits of 
enhanced compensation and prestige that managers of larger firms typically enjoy.  If this opportunistic behavior 
occurs, unitary leadership firms should pay out less of their firm's free cash flows to security holders.  The proportion 
of free cash flow disbursement is calculated as interest expense plus dividend payments divided by earnings before 
depreciation, interest, and taxes (Cash Disbursement).  As theorized, dual leadership firms pay out a greater 
proportion of their free cash flow to security holders (.293) than unitary leadership firms (.239). 
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Selected Variables 
 
Mean  Std. Dev. 
Sales ($m)  4.612    3.286 
ROE      .173      .082 
Total Comp. ($m)  2.603    2.797 
SGA/Sales    .219      .110 
Debt/Equity Ratio    .494      .664 
m = million 
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Lastly, I seek to determine if there is any 
difference in overall profitability between 
unitary and dual leadership firms.  The 
measure of profitability employed is ROE 
(net income/common stockholder's equity).  
Perusing Table 2 reveals that the average 
ROE of unitary leadership firms is .170 
(17.0%) as compared to .176 (17.6%) for 
dual leadership firms.  The greater 
profitability of dual leadership firms is 
consistent with agency problem theory 
predictions.  Empirical tests performed by 
other authors have found either that dual leadership firms are more profitable than unitary leadership firms (Rechner 
and Dalton (1991)) or their is no difference in profitability between the two type of firms (Brickley, Coles, and 
Jarrell (1997)). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 For some time, practitioners and academics have been trying to determine whether it is better for a 
company's shareholders to allow the CEO of the company to also be Chairman of the Board or whether another 
person (an independent director) should hold the board Chair position   Not surprisingly, most executives believe 
one person should hold both positions while academics hold mixed views of the subject.  The empirical results 
presented in this study suggest that a dual leadership structure is superior for most firms because it allows the board 
to better control the opportunistic behavior of the firm's managers.  Specifically, unitary leadership firms are shown 
to incur significantly higher CEO compensation expense and selling, general, and administrative expense, use less 
debt in their capital structures, pay out a smaller proportion of their free cash flows, and are less profitable than dual 
leadership firms.  Each of these results indicates greater opportunistic behavior by the managers of unitary leadership 
firms. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1. Firms in the banking industry were not included in this study. 
2. Complete data was not available for all 178 firms, consequently, some empirical tests involve less than the 
full sample of firms. 
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